Empirical findings in physiology and psychology show that disabled persons often develop physical and mental mechanisms to compensate for disabilities. Coping mechanisms may not be limited to the psycho-physiological domain, however, and may extend to economic behavior. Improved economic decision-making could result in better survival prospects among disabled persons in modern, knowledge-based societies. In this study, we test for differences in cognitive bias and economic behavioral heuristics among physically disabled and non-disabled populations. Using unique micro data from an Israeli government natural experiment, we assess loss aversion in home purchase among disabled and nondisabled households. Results of survival analysis indicate that the physically disabled are substantially less loss averse in timing of home purchase. Also, loss aversion attenuates with degree of disability. Research findings provide new evidence suggesting that the compensatory mechanisms of disabled households extend to the economic domain and result in more rationale economic decision-making. The set of coping mechanisms developed and acquired by the disabled to compensate for physical impairments may not be limited to the psycho-physiological domain.
INTRODUCTION
Empirical findings in physiology and psychology show that disabled persons often develop physical and mental mechanisms to help compensate for disabilities. According to Bishop (2005) , disabled persons utilize such coping mechanisms to minimize gaps caused by their impairments. As further suggested by Devins et al. (1983) , Yoshida (1993) , Livneh and Antonak (1997) , and Bishop and Feist-Price (2002) , such strategies and mechanisms allow disabled persons increased control over their health and environment. In physiology, Cattaneo and Vecchi (2011) summarize a long series of studies indicating the development of compensatory mechanisms among blind persons, including enhanced nonvisual, perceptual, sensorial, and cortical-level abilities [see, for example, Starlinger (1981) , Muchnick, Efrati, Nemeth, Malin, and Hildesheimer (1991) , Hull and Mason (1995) , Röder, Rosler, and Neville (2001) , Amedi, Raz, Pianka, Malach, and Zohary (2003) , Hamilton, Pascual-Leone, and Schlaug (2004) , and Crawford et al. (2008) ].
The set of coping mechanisms developed and acquired by the disabled to compensate for physical impairments may not be limited to the psycho-physiological domain.
Compensating mechanisms also may extend to household economic decision-making. For example, disability status may give rise to economic behavioral heuristics that differ from those of non-disabled persons. Specifically, just as disability status might lead to enhanced physical coping mechanisms, so too might such status result in diminished cognitive bias and improved economic rationality. In line with Stanovich and West (2000) , the latter could provide better survival prospects for disabled persons in knowledge-based, technological societies. 1 In a recent study, Keysar et al. (2012) , show experimentally that subject use of a foreign language decreases decision biases and reduces loss aversion. They hypothesize that use of a foreign language reduces the opportunity for spontaneous response and results in a more consciously measured and considered mode of thinking. In an analogous manner, consistent with Keysar et al. (2012) and others in physiology and psychology, physical disability also may result in greater dependence on more deliberate and systematic mental processes. 2, 3 iteration of the program. Our research employs survival analysis to specify and test whether physically disabled and non-disabled public housing tenants exhibited different degrees of loss aversion behavior in their time-to-purchase decisions. 5 Specifically, we estimate the asymmetric response of disabled and non-disabled households to gains and losses associated with deviations in home price reduction rates from a reference reduction rate. In our context, a household experiences a loss whenever the current rate of reduction in price is less than the reference reduction rate. In contrast, the household experiences a gain if the proposed rate of reduction in price exceeds the reference rate. In that vein, a greater absolute effect of a loss (compared to a gain) in the hazard to exercise the purchase option (under the current reduction rate) is consistent with a loss-averse behavioral pattern. In other words, loss aversion implies that the decrease in the hazard to exercise that follows a loss is greater in absolute values than the increase in the hazard to exercise that follows a gain.
Our reference reduction rate takes the form of a simple average of all prior price reduction rates offered to the household. 6 The severity of the household disability is indicated by a disability index (on a scale of 0% for non-disabled to 100% for severely cases of disability) as determined by a medical committee of the National Insurance Institute of Israel.
We also examine the sensitivity of loss aversion behavior among the disabled and nondisabled households to individual demographic characteristics.
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Research findings suggest high levels of loss aversion in home purchase among both disabled and non-disabled households. However, disabled households are significantly less 5 Arbel, Ben-Shahar, and Gabriel (2012) test for the prevalence of the anchoring heuristic in timing of home purchase among public housing residents. The current study focuses on a different behavioral heuristic and further extends the methodology used in Arbel et al. (2012) to assess loss aversion behavior of disabled persons compared with non-disabled population. 6 While the simple average of one's past price reduction rates appeared most significant as a reference in our outcomes, our results were qualitatively robust to one's first and previous maximum reduction rates (see section 5 below).
7 Recent empirical literature shows that the degree of loss aversion varies with individual characteristics and market conditions. Genesove and Mayer (2001) and List (2003 List ( , 2004 List ( , 2011 , for example, show that loss aversion attenuates with market experience [for a further discussion and review, see, for example, Levitt and List (2008) and Della-Vigna (2009)]; Niedrich, Weathers, Hill, and Bell (2009) show that range effects are stronger among coupon users while frequency effects are stronger among consumers who have been exposed to a trend price over time; Kliger and Kudryavtsev (2008) find indications that reference points are more significant when information flow is low and prices are sensitive to market fluctuation (as is the case with stocks of low market capitalization and high beta firms); Li, Kenrick, Griskevicius, and Neuberg (2012) find that loss aversion diminishes with mating motives in men while self-protective motives increases loss aversion behavior in both men and women; Strahilevitz and Loewenstein (1998) and Vieider (2009) find that loss aversion intensifies with duration of ownership; and Vieider (2009) and Zhang and Fishbach (2005) find that loss aversion attenuates with accountability and positive mood, respectively.
loss averse than the non-disabled. Specifically, results show that while non-disabled households are 4.55 times more responsive to declines in price reduction rates than they are to comparable increases in price reductions, that same loss-gain ratio for 100 percent disabled households declines to 2.92 (the difference between these estimates is significant at the 1 percent level). Further, the attenuation in loss aversion with degree of disability is robust to various reference rates and to sample variations. Moreover, we find that loss aversion among both disabled and non-disabled households is sensitive to demographic characteristics such as age of household head and marital status. 8 The plan of the paper is as follow: Section 2 describes the data, section 3 presents the empirical model, and section 4 provides evidence illustrating the asymmetric responses to gains and losses associated with changes in the reduction rates offered to public housing households. Section 5 presents a series of robustness tests whereas section 6 examines the sensitivity of the estimated loss-gain ratio to demographic characteristics of disabled and nondisabled households. Finally, section 7 provides summary and concluding remarks.
A DESCRIPTION OF THE SAMPLE
We apply unique microdata from a recent natural policy experiment to empirically explore loss aversion among physically unit. 9 The home sales programs can be described as call (real) options that allow tenants to purchase their public rental units within a given timeframe and at a specified exercise price (set as a function of the market price net of specified programmatic price reductions as described below). Each iteration of the program provides an opportunity to assess tenant behavioral response to a specified incentive structure.
The panel nature of the data allows us to examine tenant response to successive program incentives, controlling for household socio-economic and demographic as well as market characteristics.
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8 Specifically, degree of loss aversion among both disabled and non-disabled households declines with unmarried status and age. This result stands in contrast to the experimental finding of Mather, Mazar, Gorlick, Lighthall, Burgeno, Schoeke, and Ariely (2012) according to which older adults appeared more loss averse than younger adults.
9 Note that as of September 2008, the sixth sale program is no longer valid. This program has been followed by a complete halt of all programs.
10 As describe below, we construct the dataset as an unbalanced panel comprising of up to 114 months (March 1999 -August 2008 . Two reasons justify this approach as opposed to the alternative, namely an unbalanced panel of six sale programs: 1) the latter does not weight the very dissimilar length of the different sale programs in months; 2) reduction rates may vary during the period of each sales program due to changing socio-demographic characteristics, such as the birth of a new child. In such cases, the latter data structure imposes loss of information.
6
Data for the analysis are comprised of all public housing tenants residing in Amidar
Ltd. housing units. Amidar managed approximately half of the total public housing stock in Israel in 1999 and was the largest public housing corporation in Israel during the period of analysis. The raw sample includes all dwelling units managed by Amidar (total of 58,849 units). Given the focus of the study, we adjust the sample to exclude units that were inaccessible to the physically disabled. Accordingly, the sample includes detached and first floor condominium units as well as units above the first floor in structures with an elevator.
Further, we limit the analysis to households exercising the purchase option (and address potential sample selection issues in section 3). The final sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 6,853 households including 6,543 non-disabled buyers and 310 disabled buyers.
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We assess the response of tenants to varying price reduction rates over a period of up to 114 months. The time-varying reduction rates are set exogenously by the government using household socio-demographic and locational characteristics. 12 The panel structure enables us to employ survival analysis to predict the proportion of households that exercise the purchase option in each period as well as the time duration until option exercise. In this context, tenants fail to survive (failure=1) and are excluded from the sample at the time of their switch from renter to owner status. Table 1A provides summary statistics on the cross-section of non-disabled and disabled purchasers at the date of home purchase option exercise. 13 . Table 1B presents summary statistics for the sample panel across all time periods (excluding the date of purchase). As indicated in table 1A, the average appraised value (before reduction) of the purchased housing units (UNIT_VALUE) at the date of purchase was $89,221 for nondisabled and $95,581 for disabled buyers. 14 Table 1A further indicates that the average rate 11 Purchasers who entered the sample after the beginning of the sample period, cases of missing information regarding rent payments, and cases of more than 5 percent mismatch between the calculated reduction rate and the current reduction rate at the date of purchase have been further omitted from the sample. We are grateful to the assistance of Ronit Gerafi from Amidar LTD for providing us with detailed information regarding the calculation of the price reduction rates and to Smadar Shatz for her invaluable assistance in generating the panel.
12 Unit-root tests of all panels support the conclusion that reduction rate schemes are random walk. This helps to mitigate concerns of endogeneity between the survival time until the exercise of the purchase option and the price reductions offered to tenants. For an overview of public housing in Israel see Bar Dadon (2000) . 13 All variables measured in NIS (New Israeli Shekels) are converted to U.S. dollars using an exchange rate of 1 NIS equals $0.25.
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of price reduction of purchased units from appraised value at the date of purchase (RED i,t ) was 78 percent and roughly equal across non-disabled and disabled groups. As is evident, public housing tenants exercised the purchase option at deeply discounted values. Tables 1A-1B further provide information The variable D i denotes the degree of disability, measured by a disability index, experienced by household i. The disability index ranges from 0 percent for non-disabled to 100 percent for severe disability and is determined by formal statutory instructions of a medical committee of the National Insurance Institute of Israel. As shown in table 1A, the sampled disabled population has an average disability index score of just over 77 percent.
Further, figure 1 displays the distribution of the disability index among disabled public 15 Unlike the United States, low-income households in Israel are generally exempted from filing tax returns and there are only limited sanctions put into place by the Ministry of Housing and Construction for not filing an income report on part of public housing tenants. Thus, income is available for only 864 of the 6,543 non-disabled tenants and 138 of the 310 disabled tenants included in the sample. In the next section, we address the censoring of income and the fact that current income is a poor proxy for permanent income. Also, the average annual net income per household in Israel over the examined period is about $30,000. The $11,578 annual income figure of the non-disabled group matches the lowest income decile in Israel. Furthermore, note that, on average, the net-of-reduction housing purchase price is equivalent to about 21 months of earnings.
16 A number of factors may have contributed to the relatively older average age of household heads in our sample. Firstly, all construction of new public housing in Israel ceased more than a decade ago and supply of units is highly constrained. At the same time, the low rental prices of public housing incentivize tenants to stay in their units. The combination of these factors may limit opportunities for younger households to enter the public housing system.
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housing tenants in the sample. As is evident, 75 percent and 100 percent disability scores are the first and second most frequent levels of disability, respectively. Note as well that 94 of the 310 households in the disability group include those where at least one adult member is confined to a wheelchair (WHEELCHAIR i ). 
TESTING FOR LOSS AVERSION AMONG DISABLED AND NON-DISABLED GROUPS
We test for systematic variation in loss aversion among disabled and non-disabled populations as revealed in the timing of home purchase option exercise. To do so, we assess the asymmetric response of disabled and non-disabled tenants to losses and gains associated with changes in dwelling offer price reduction rates relative to a reference reduction rate.
The empirical model consists of the following structural equations: 
In the above system of equations, t and i stand for time and tenant indices, respectively; λ(t) denotes the hazard function, which captures the exercise rate of the purchase option; and λ 00 (t) is the baseline to the hazard function, which reflects variation over time in hazard risk at baseline levels of the covariates. The independent variables in equation (1) include the reference price reduction rate, REF i,t , which is equal to the average of all previous t-1 program reduction rates in the price of the dwelling (measured in percentage points) offered to tenant i at time t; RED i,t REF i,t denotes the difference between i's current reduction rate and the reference reduction rate; NEG i,t and POS i,t and are dummy variables that equal 1 if RED i,t REF i,t is negative or positive, respectively, and 0 otherwise.
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CONTROL is comprised of a matrix of control variables that includes: AVG_RED t , the current average reduction rate across all i at each t; RENT i,t , the net rent paid by the tenant; ∆STD t , the first difference in the volatility of house price returns; PROJ (INCOME) i , the level of permanent income as projected from equation (2) represents the disability index (on a scale of 0 to100 percent), the estimation of equation (1) after substituting these equations allows us to test for different degrees of loss aversion among Equations (2) and (3) reflect two auxiliary regressions. The sample for equation (2) includes the entire population of purchasers and non-purchasers-a total of 58,665 observations (of which 47,588 are non-disabled and 11,077 are disabled tenants), where the dependent variable,
z , is a binary variable that receives a value of 1 in the case that the household filed an income tax report during the sample period and 0 otherwise. 22 On the 12 right-hand side of (2), the matrices X 1 and X 2 include vectors of households' sociodemographic, locational, and dwelling structure characteristics, respectively. The matrix X 1 includes: DURATION i (duration of residence in the public housing asset measured in years); (2), where
is the inverse-mills ratio. The matrix X 1 includes the same household socio-demographic and locational characteristics described above,   is a vector of parameters, and u 2,i is a random disturbance term.
Equations (2) and (3) address three potential concerns regarding the dataset. The first is that current income may be a poor proxy for permanent income. The second concern is that the INCOME term may be censored as some households in our sample avoid reporting their Housing and Construction for not filing a report. Accordingly, the policy provided an incentive for high-income households to avoid filing such a report. 13 income (low-income households in Israel are generally exempted from filing tax returns-see footnote 21). Finally, our sample of purchasers may be subject to selection bias due to difficulties of low-income renter households in affording and financing the purchase of a dwelling unit. Consequently, the Heckman correction is required. 23 Because the level of income is also potentially positively correlated with the decision to purchase the dwelling unit, the use of the purchase decision as the selection criteria is appropriate.
In sum, based on the Heckman selection procedure in equation (2), we generate a vector of projected income values in equation (3), which estimates the permanent income of each tenant in the full sample. We then incorporate this vector into the unbalanced panel of 6,853 buyers in equation (1). In that manner, we address the disincentive of high-income tenants to report their income level. Further, we address the concern that current income may be a poor proxy for permanent income.
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Given the system of equations (1)- (3), and prior to assessment of loss aversion among the disabled and non-disabled populations, we seek to verify that tenants indeed account for the reference reduction rate in their home purchase decision. We test for loss aversion among the disabled and non-disabled groups by focusing on their asymmetric purchase response to losses and gains in programmatic price reductions.
Particularly, we compute the loss-gain ratio for the non-disabled and the 23 The positive and significant Inverse-Mills ratio obtained in the estimation procedure (estimated coefficient of 1,164 and standard error of 135.9) supports the hypothesis of selection bias addressed via this procedure. Also, current annual income of purchasers turns out to be $1,951 higher than nonpurchasers -the difference is significant at the 1%-level (t-value equals 24.93). 24 Estimation results of equations (2) and (3) are given at the appendix. Note also that the model's structure permits over identification of both equations (1) 
14 disabled populations, respectively. A ratio equal to 1 implies no loss aversion, whereas the greater the ratio in excess of 1, the larger the degree of loss aversion. As discussed above, we hypothesize that the degree of loss aversion among the disabled group is lower than that of the non-disabled group.
ASYMMETRIC RESPONSE TO LOSSES AND GAINS AND THE DEGREE OF DISABILITY
Prior to estimation of loss aversion behavior per equations (1)- (3), we seek to reject the possibility that tenants could collect information on the likelihood of future reduction rates for use in strategic exercise of the purchase option. To this end, we examine whether price reductions follow non-random patterns that allows one to predict of future reduction rates. We reject this possibility by testing for the presence of unit roots in the reduction rate panels.
Note, unlike the standard approach, our objective is to demonstrate that the series in all panels are non-stationary and that the unit-root hypothesis is not rejected. As shown in Also, in section 2 of table 3, we compute the loss-gain ratio for the non-disabled and the disabled groups. Figure 2 graphs the computed loss-gain ratio across the disability index.
The loss-gain ratio for non-disabled equals 4.55, implying that, on average, a 1 percent decrease in the current reduction rate relative to the reference reduction rate discourages a purchase in the same manner that a 4.55-percent increase in those figures encourages a purchase. Interestingly, the projected loss-gain ratio after substituting D i =100 (100% disability index) is only 2.92. Moreover, the ratio 4.55/2.92 is significantly different from 1 at the 1%-level (chi-square-value equals 37.99 with one degree of freedom). 28 Results thus show that the asymmetry associated with gains and losses declines with degree of disability. (2) and (3) are given in the appendix.
27 Similar rejection of the null is obtained for the case of 50 percent disability (D i =50) 28 Similar rejection is obtained for the case of 50 percent disability (D i =50). The loss-gain ratio of 4.55/3.55 is significantly different from 1 at the 1%-level (chi-square value equals 37.99 with one degree of freedom). 29 To assess the robustness of these results, we re-estimate equation (1) 
ROBUSTNESS TESTS
In this section, we assess the robustness of our findings to issues of sampling and test design. Specifically, we below address sensitivity of results to 4 key elements of our empirical approach, including focus on a particular reference rate of price reduction; sample of disabled population; sample of non-disabled population; and sample of purchasers only.
To further gauge the sensitivity of our findings to choice of reference price reduction rate, we re-estimate equation (1) Table 5 . Findings indicate that the disabled remain significantly less loss averse. Specifically, use of the above alternative price reduction rate results in a loss-gain ratio of 2.38 for non-disabled and 1.85 for disabled population when substituting D i =100%. The ratio 2.38/1.85 is different from 1 at the 1 percent level (chisquare value equals 24.28).
Note that for the 310 disabled households in our sample, we have information of source of disability only for 212 observations. In that regard, we know that all of the 212 surveyed households are either confined to a wheelchair and/or victims of Polio. For the remaining 98 observations the source of disability is not indicated in the sample. We accordingly re-estimate the model using only those households for whom the source of disability is known. We run this estimation for both REF i,t and As shown in table 6, results are largely robust to choice of sample. In the case of REF i,t , the loss-gain ratio equals 2.59 for the disabled group with known physical disability and 4.56 for the non-disabled group (compared to 2.92 for the entire disabled population and place of the average reduction rate REF i,t . This substitution increases the frequency of purchases at a loss (compared to the reference reduction rate) to 48 cases. We then re-estimate the following variation of equation (1) is now negative and significant at the 1 percent level for both the non-disabled and disabled populations. Moreover, note the difference in this coefficient between the disabled and non-disabled groups: a onepercent increase in the absolute value of the difference between the current and the reference reduction rates is associated with a 4.12 and 6.38 percent decrease in the hazard rate of option exercise for the disabled and non-disabled groups, respectively. These figures are different from one another at the 5 percent level. Results thus indicate a lower degree of loss aversion among the disabled population both on the gain and loss sides. Finally, recall that our analysis focuses on timing of purchase among the subset of public housing tenants that exercised the purchase option at some point during the program period. As noted above, our focus on purchasers only seeks to address a potential sample selection bias, as some tenants may have failed to purchase their dwelling due to income constraints. An additional robustness test thus seeks to expand our sample as to include tenants who were not bound by affordability constraints but otherwise chose not to purchase.
To expand the sample in this manner, we assume a 25 percent monthly mortgage payment-to-income ratio as the upper limit for mortgage availability. For each of the nonpurchasers in our sample, we then compute a payment-to-income ratio assuming home purchase at the current price reduction rate using a 20-year, 100% loan-to-value mortgage. 30 We then incorporate in our sample all non-purchasing tenants whose computed payment-toincome ratio is not greater than 25%. This procedure yields a total of 705 additional observations, 110 of which are added to the disabled sample population. 30 Borrowers could of course commonly apply for lower mortgage installments with a 30-year loan and, say, 80% loan-to-value ratio. Lower installments, however, would imply lower payment-to-income ratio, which would, in turn, imply that our affordability threshold attenuates. We thus choose harsher loan conditions as to generate an "upper-bound" on our affordability measure. Also, we apply hedonic price estimation using the observed prices of the purchased units to project the pre-reduction (market) price of the housing unit of non-purchasers. Results of this estimation are available from the authors upon request. Finally, as our income variable reflects one's income in November 2005 (see footnote 14), we deflate and inflate the per tenant income variable using the time-series of average current wage published by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics.
Expansion of the sample in this manner serves to reduce the loss-gain ratio for both disabled and non-disabled groups (see table 8 ). The loss-gain ratio now equals 3.25 for the non-disabled group and 2.30 for the disabled group when substituting D i =100%; however, the ratio 3.25/2.30 remains different from 1 at the 1 percent significance level (chi-square value is 53.32). We repeat this exercise substituting the first reduction rate for the average of prior price reduction rates. Again, the loss-gain ratio for the non-disabled (disabled group when substituting D i =100%) is 2.33 (1.73) where the figures are different from one another at the 1 percent significance level.
LOSS AVERSION AND DEMOGRAPHICS
In this section, we explore the sensitivity of the loss-gain ratio to demographic characteristics of disabled and non-disabled populations. Specifically, we focus on marital status and age of household head. In order to examine the effect of the qualitative MARRIED term, we split the sample into married and unmarried groups and re-estimate equations (1)- (3) separately for each group. To examine the sensitivity of the loss-gain ratio to HEAD_AGE, we extend equation (1) to include the following interaction terms:  is the transpose of the column vector 6  ,
 is a random disturbance term and all other variables are as described following equation (1) Figures 3A graphs the computed loss-gain ratio across the disability index for married and non-married households. 31 Note first that the loss-gain ratio trends down with disability status for both married and unmarried tenants. Moreover, unmarried households are significantly less loss averse than their married counterparts among both the disabled and non-disabled households. For disabled households with 50% disability, the loss-gain ratio drops from 4.43 for married households to 2.94 for unmarried households, where the difference is significant at the 5 percent level. For disabled households with 100% disability the loss-gain ratio drops from 3.64 for married households to 2.57 for unmarried households (the difference, however, is statistically insignificant). Among non-disabled households, the loss-gain ratio declines from 5.65 for married households to 3.44 for unmarried households, where the difference is significant at the 1 percent level.
In figure 3B we graph the loss-gain ratio across age of household head for nondisabled and disabled (with 50% and 100% disability) households. 32 In contrast to experimental findings by Mather, Mazar, Gorlick, Lighthall, Burgeno, Schoeke, and Ariely (2012), our analysis indicates that loss aversion attenuates with age of household head (among both disabled and non-disabled groups). For disabled households with 50% (100%) disability, the loss-gain ratio declines from 4.67 (3.49) at age 30 to 3.46 (2.99) at age 60. The declines in loss aversion for the 50% (100%) disability groups are significant at 1%-level (insignificant). Comparable figures for the non-disabled population are 7.04 and 4.11 with the difference being significant at the 1 percent level.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Empirical findings in physiology and psychology show that disabled persons often develop physical and mental mechanisms to compensate for disabilities. However, those 31 The outcomes of the estimation are not presented and are available from the authors upon request.
32 Again, the outcomes of the estimation are not presented and are available from the authors upon request. Also, note that under the structure of (1b), our computed loss-gain ratio, coping mechanisms may not be limited to the psycho-physiological domain and may extend as well to household economic behavior. Indeed, disability status may give rise to economic behavioral heuristics that differ from those of non-disabled persons. Just as disability status leads to enhancements in physical coping mechanisms, so too might such status result in better economic decisions. In the context of evolutionary economics, enhanced rationality of economic decision-making could result in better survival prospects in modern, knowledgebased technological societies.
In this study, we test for differences in cognitive bias and behavioral heuristics among physically disabled and non-disabled populations. Specifically, using micro data from a unique Israeli government experiment to privatize public housing, we assess loss aversion in home purchase among disabled and non-disabled households. Specifically, results show that while non-disabled households are 4.55 times more responsive to declines in house price reduction rates relative to comparable rate increases, that same loss-gain ratio falls to 2.92 for disabled households. Further, loss aversion attenuates with degree of disability. Research findings are robust to reference price reduction rates and to sample stratifications. Also, the degree of loss aversion among both disabled and non-disabled households attenuates with age and marital status. Results provide new evidence suggesting that compensatory mechanisms of disabled households extend to the economic domain and result in more rationale economic decision-making. Notes: The histogram refers only to disabled tenants who live in: 1) the first floor of condominiums without elevator. 2) any floor in condominiums with elevator; and 3) detached units. Disabled tenants who live in condominium apartments without elevators above the first floor were excluded from the sample. Households, who entered the public-housing project after t=0 were also excluded. The disabled index is measured in percentage points and reflects the highest index among the adult members of the household (in the case that more than one subject per household is disabled). The exact distribution is given in the following 
where D i is the disability index on a scale between 0 percent (households whose all members are non-disabled) to 100 percent (households with at least one member who is totally dependent disabled), and
i t i t RED REF  and 0 otherwise. The sample includes non-disabled buyers and disabled buyers who live in accessible units. Those units include: 1) the first floor of condominium apartments without elevator. 2) any floor in condominium apartments with elevator; and 3) detached units. Disabled tenants who live in condominium apartments without elevators above the first floor and households who were not part of the sample at t=0 were excluded from the sample. The Breusch-Pagan test rejects the null hypothesis that random disturbance terms are homoscedastic with respect to the independent variables for the full model. Calculated chi-squared value of 644.87 is significant at the 1%-level (the 1% critical chi-squared value with 21 degrees of freedom is only 38.93). Consequently, robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Significant values at the 5%-and 1%-levels are marked with two and three asterisks, respectively is the running maximum among all prior reduction rates (excluding the current reduction rate. The sample includes non-disabled buyers and disabled buyers who live in accessible units. Those units include: 1) the first floor of condominium apartments without elevator. 2) any floor in condominium apartments with elevator; and 3) detached units. Disabled tenants who live in condominium apartments without elevators above the first floor and households who were not part of the sample at t=0 were excluded from the sample. Columns (1) and (2) refer to non-disabled and disabled households, respectively. The Breusch-Pagan tests reject the null hypothesis that random disturbance terms are homoscedastic with respect to the independent variables for both pooled samples (i.e., the pooled sample of column (1), (2)). Calculated chi-squared value of 205.59 is highly significant at the 1%-level (the 1% critical chi-squared values with 6 degrees of freedom is only 16.81). Consequently, robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Significant values at the 5%-and 1%-levels are marked with two and three asterisks, respectively 
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, where D i is the disability index on a scale between 0 percent (households whose all members are non-disabled) to 100 percent (households with at least one member who is totally dependent disabled), and NEG i,t (POS i,t 2) any floor in condominium apartments with elevator; and 3) detached units.. Disabled tenants who live in condominium apartments without elevators above the first floor and households who were not part of the sample at t=0 were excluded from the sample. The Breusch-Pagan test rejects the null hypothesis that random disturbance terms are homoscedastic with respect to the independent variables for the full model. Calculated chi-squared value of 625.68 is highly significant at the 1%-level (the 1% critical chi-squared value with 21 degrees of freedom is only 38.93). Consequently, robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Significant values at the 5%-and 1%-levels are marked with two and three asterisks, respectively 
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is the first reduction rate the tenant faces at t=1. Physically disabled households are households whose source of disability is known in the data (head-of-household or spouse are either confined to a wheelchair or suffer from a Polio disease). The Breusch-Pagan tests reject the null hypothesis that random disturbance terms are homoscedastic with respect to the independent variables for the full model. Calculated chi-squared values of 609.30 and 612.68 are highly significant at the 1%-level (the 1% critical chi-squared value with 21 degrees of freedom is only 38.93). Consequently, robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Significant values at the 1%-level are marked with three asterisks. 
is the first reduction rate the tenant faces at t=1.Physically disabled households are households whose head or spouse are either confined to a wheelchair or suffer from a Polio Disease. The BreuschPagan tests reject the null hypothesis that random disturbance terms are homoscedastic with respect to the independent variables for the full model. Calculated chi-squared values of 290.11 and 289.79 are highly significant at the 1%-level (the 1% critical chi-squared value with 21 degrees of freedom is only 38.93). Consequently, robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Significant values at the 1%-level are marked with three asterisks. 
is the first reduction rate the tenant faces at t=1. The non-buyer population in the sample maintains the condition that their potential payment-to-income ratio is no greater than 25 percent of household's deflated current income across all periods. To calculate the required mortgage payment, we accounted for a 240 months mortgage, which fully covers the difference between the unit deflated value and the monetary reduction rate. The units' values for buyers (affording renters) have been computed across all time-periods based on the value of the housing unit at the date of purchase (projected values obtained from a hedonic regression) deflated backward for each survival time. Deflation is based on housing price indices of average transaction prices for 9 statistical regions published by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics. Current income reflects the November 2005 wage (see footnote 21), and is deflated backward and forward based on the series of average current wage published by the Central Bureau of Statistics. The Breusch-Pagan tests reject the null hypothesis that random disturbance terms are homoscedastic with respect to the independent variables for the full model. Calculated chi-squared values of 1327.94 and 1098.18 are highly significant at the 1%-level (the 1% critical chi-squared value with 21 degrees of freedom is only 38.93). Consequently, robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Significant values at the 1%-level are marked with three asterisks. . The gray dashed (black solid) line refers to marital status of single, divorced or widow (married). For the nondisabled group, the difference between 5.65 and 3.44 is statistically significant at the 1%-level (calculated chi-squared value with one degree of freedom of 7.05). For 50% disabled, the difference between 4.43 and 2.94 is statistically significant at the 5%-level (calculated chi-squared value with one degree of freedom of 4.54). Finally, for 100% disabled, the difference between 3.64 and 2.57 is insignificant (calculated chi-squared value with one degree of freedom of 2.44). (the gray dashed line). For the non-disabled group, the difference between 7.04 and 4.11 is statistically significant at the 1%-level (calculated chi-squared value with one degree of freedom of 26.24). For the 50% disability, the difference between 4.67 and 3.46 is statistically significant at the 1%-level (calculated chi-squared value with one degree of freedom of 8.85). Finally, for the 100% disability group, the difference between 3.49 and 2.99 is insignificant (calculated chi-squared value with one degree of freedom of 2.18).
